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The fiscal cliff, policy uncertainty and tax 
reform 
By Seth H. Giertz, University of Nebraska and Jacob Feldman, George Mason University - 
11/30/12 03:15 PM ET  
The founding fathers purposefully designed a political system that perpetuates gridlock. Frictions 
in political decision-making should foster stable policies. However, in recent years, this has been 
turned on its head. 
 
In recent decades, Congress has passed a series of budget control acts intended to impose 
discipline on the budget process. These acts, by encouraging policy phase-ins, phase-outs and 
expiration dates, have had the unintended consequence of policy uncertainty. 
A growing literature is finding that policy uncertainty imposes substantial economic costs. Policy 
uncertainty leads individuals to misallocate resources or to incur added costs from planning for 
possible scenarios. Policy uncertainty, it is argued, leads investors to sit on the sidelines, rather 
than bet on whether or how Congress will act. 
 
In a newly released study by the Mercatus Center, we find that investors may do worse than sit 
on the sidelines. We argue that policy uncertainty may decrease productive business activities, 
like research and hiring, while increasing resources spent on unproductive investments, like 
lobbying government. 
 
We argue that policy uncertainty is a signal that government is open for business. With little 
policy uncertainty, higher returns may be sought from investing in productive activities. 
However, when government is receptive to policy changes, the returns from lobbying, political 
action committees, etc. may be more remunerative. We believe that this may be yet another 
important cost of policy uncertainty. 
 Our hypothesis builds on the work of William Baumol, who argued that entrepreneurship can be 
divided into productive, unproductive, and destructive activities. Baumol chronicles great 
innovations made over wide swaths of history, but notes that, in many cases, little effort was 
made to disseminate these inventions to the masses or to use the inventions to increase 
productivity. Baumol argues that political and cultural institutions play a key role in whether or 
not innovations are geared toward improved productivity and economic growth. In many 
preindustrial societies, the path to wealth was through rulers, and not the marketplace. 
 
The fiscal cliff and chronic policy uncertainty in recent years underscore the need for 
fundamental tax (and spending) reform. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was America’s most recent 
fundamental tax reform. This reform closed loopholes, broadened the tax base, and lowered 
rates. On the downside, it was susceptible to constant tinkering. In fact, the report of the 2005 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform noted that Congress had subsequently 
amended the tax code approximately 15,000 times! 
 
In their detailed review of the effects of the Tax Reform Act for the Journal of Economic 
Literature, Alan Auerbach of the University of California and Joel Slemrod of the University of 
Michigan concluded that “Even the simplification potential of radical tax reform depends on how 
enduring a simple, broad-based tax can be, in the face of constant political pressure to 
reintroduce special ‘encouragements’ or to redistribute the tax burden.” We argue that stability 
and resistance to constant tinkering should be a first order considerations in any tax reform, and a 
major lesson from the 1986 reform. 
 
Giertz is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Nebraska and formerly worked 
for the Congressional Budget Office. Feldman is a research analyst with the Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University. 
 
